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In this article, we study how the strength of outcome dependence, defined as the extent to which
people’s outcomes depend on authority’s decisions, influences their reactions to voice or no-voice
procedures. We suggest that in situations where people are strongly outcome dependent they assume
that the authority may not consider their views, and therefore voice procedures exert less influence on
people’s procedure judgments than in situations where they are not strongly outcome dependent.
Findings of two experiments corroborate this line of reasoning: In strongly outcome dependent
situations, recipients’ procedure judgments are influenced less strongly by voice versus no-voice
procedures than in moderate or weak outcome dependent situations. Furthermore, these effects were
found for both pre-decision voice (Experiment 1) and for post-decision voice (Experiment 2). It is
concluded that strong outcome dependence decreases the value-expressive function of voice oppor-
tunities. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Justice is a key issue for understanding social behavior, as people are influenced profoundly by the
extent to which they perceive social situations as fair or unfair (Folger, 1984). An important
conceptualization of social justice judgments is the extent to which people perceive decision-making
processes as fair. Social psychologists have referred to the perceived fairness of decision-making
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Procedural justice in authority relations 12871992; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). Procedural justice phenomena are usually studied in a specific type
of interpersonal relations, namely authority relations. After all, people usually experience fair or unfair
procedures in their encounters with decision-makers (Tyler & Lind, 1992). In correspondence with this
observation, procedural justice effects have been studied in the context of people’s experiences with
management teams, politicians, teachers, police officers, judges, experimenters, and other authorities
(for overviews, see e.g., Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998;
Tyler & Blader, 2003; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Authority relations are thus central in
recipients’ experiences of procedural justice.
An authority relation is a specific type of interdependence relation, because authorities usually have
at least some control over decisions that influence recipients’ outcomes (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996;
Thibaut &Walker, 1975; see also Houlden, LaTour,Walker, & Thibaut, 1978). Recipients often assume
that they are more dependent on authorities than vice versa (Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den Bos, Wilke, &
Lind, 1998). We refer to the extent to which recipients believe that their outcomes depend on
authorities’ decisions as the strength of outcome dependence. Previous research has investigated direct
relations between the strength of outcome dependence and procedural justice judgments (e.g., Houlden
et al., 1978; Thibaut &Walker, 1975). In a dispute resolution setting, research by Houlden et al. (1978)
indicated that people prefer decision-making procedures that grant authorities a certain amount of
decision control (i.e., control over the final decision), but people generally preferred to retain process
control for themselves (i.e., control over the presentation of evidence). These results suggest that
people are comfortable with certain levels of outcome dependence, as long as it is possible to have
meaningful interactions with the authority.
It must be noted, however, that in authority relations people are likely to perceive themselves on a
continuum ranging from extreme outcome dependence to outcome independence. Sometimes
decisions are made in social situations where recipients perceive themselves as so strongly dependent
that they believe meaningful interactions with the authority are barely possible. For instance, in
autocratic political regimes or in extremely hierarchical organizations such as the army, subordinates
may be reluctant to engage in an open discussion with their superiors. This contrasts with how people
relate to authorities in less dependent situations. In social structures that are relatively more egalitarian,
such as representative democracies, people often regard an open discussion with decision-makers as a
desirable and realistic possibility. In the current research, we assess people’s responses to
decision-making procedures in strongly dependent situations as compared with less strongly dependent
situations.VOICE AND OUTCOME DEPENDENCEAn illustration of a typical procedural justice phenomenon can be found in the effects of voice: People
tend to evaluate procedures that allow them an opportunity to voice their opinion as fairer than
procedures that deny them such an opportunity (see, e.g., Folger, 1977; Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, &
Corkan, 1979). Furthermore, voice procedures positively influence numerous other variables, such as
people’s affective reactions (e.g., Folger et al., 1979; Lind & Tyler, 1988). The effects of voice
procedures have origins beyond people’s desire to influence subsequent decisions, which is evidenced
by findings that voice effects materialize even if people’s opinions did not influence the final decision.
For instance, research has revealed that people perceive their outcomes as fairer following voice as
opposed to no-voice procedures even if authorities first make a decision and only then allow recipients
an opportunity to voice their opinions (‘post-decision voice’; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; see also
Platow, Filardo, Troselj, Grace, & Ryan, 2006). Tyler (1987) noted that voice has an importantCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1286–1297 (2007)
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independent from people’s desire to influence subsequent decisions. The reason for this is that being
allowed voice communicates that the authority is willing to consider the recipient’s views, and hence, it
suggests that the authority makes an effort to be polite, to respect the rights of the recipient, and to be a
fair decision-maker (Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992).
Empirical studies suggest that when people perceive themselves as strongly outcome dependent on
authorities, their positive reactions to voice procedures might be decreased. In particular, research on
the relation between power distance values and voice procedures suggested and found that people who
have higher power distance values place less weight on the quality of their treatment by authorities than
peoplewho have lower power distance values (Tyler, Lind, &Huo, 2000). Further evidence for this idea
was produced by findings that people who live in high power distance cultures are less influenced by
voice procedures than people who live in low power distance cultures (Brockner et al., 2001). Tyler
et al. (2000) and Brockner et al. (2001) explained their findings by asserting that people with high
power distance values anticipate role-constrained interactions with authorities, because they regard
outcome dependence as a natural aspect of the social hierarchy. In contrast, people with low power
distance values expect authorities to share their power, and therefore feel entitled to having voice in the
decision-making process.
In these previous studies, power distance was regarded as a cultural dimension that specifies
individual differences in people’s normative belief systems regarding the extent to which they should
have voice in a decision-making process (Brockner et al., 2001; Tyler et al., 2000). The current research
was designed to extend these previous studies in twoways. As a first extension, we argue that individual
differences in normative beliefs are not necessary to find effects of outcome dependence on reactions to
voice procedures. In two experiments, we tested the prediction that when participants are randomly
assigned to situations where they are versus are not strongly outcome dependent, a similar moderating
influence on reactions to voice procedures is likely to occur: When people believe to be strongly
outcome dependent, we expect them to display less positive reactions to voice procedures than when
they do not believe to be strongly outcome dependent. The reason for this is that if people believe that
they are strongly outcome dependent on an authority, they are likely to believe that they are unable to
have meaningful interactions with the authority. That is, the strong outcome dependent relation may
promote suspicions that the authority might not seriously consider recipients’ views, and thus does not
display a genuine effort to be polite or to be a fair decision-maker. As such, a second extension of the
current research is that we investigate whether the effects of strong outcome dependence on reactions to
voice procedures are attributable to the implications for the value-expressive function that voice
opportunities may serve. That is, we expected to find effects of strong outcome dependence on people’s
reactions to voice opportunities before a decision (Experiment 1) but also to post-decision voice
(Experiment 2). In the following, we introduce our experiments in more detail.EXPERIMENT 1Given that we predict weak voice effects in situations where people’s outcomes depend strongly on
authority’s decisions, our line of reasoning implies that previous research has discovered voice effects
predominantly in situations where recipients did not believe to be strongly outcome dependent. In
developing this idea, we describe how the strength of outcome dependencewas operationalized in some
of the previous procedural justice experiments that adopted the same experimental paradigm as the
current studies (e.g. Van den Bos, 1999, 2001; Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001; Van den Bos, Wilke,
& Lind, 1998Van Prooijen, Karremans, &Van Beest, 2006; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, &Wilke, 2002,Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1286–1297 (2007)
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Procedural justice in authority relations 12892004, 2005). Participants were led to believe that a lottery would be held among all participants, and
that a few lottery tickets would be divided between the participant and another participant. Participants
typically were not told explicitly that their number of lottery tickets depended on the experimenter’s
decision, which allowed the impression that recipients were not fully (but only moderately) outcome
dependent on the authority. As a consequence, subsequent voice opportunities about how lottery tickets
should be divided may have led recipients to believe that the authority was considering their views,
which increased their evaluations of the way they were treated. This line of reasoning suggests that if
recipients are explicitly informed that they are strongly outcome dependent (e.g., explicit information
that their number of lottery tickets depends on the experimenter’s decisions), recipients are predisposed
to skepticism about the extent to which the authority will consider their views (cf. Tyler, 1987; Tyler
et al., 2000). Based on this line of reasoning we hypothesize that voice as opposed to no-voice
procedures exert less positive effects on people’s evaluations of the way they are treated if they receive
explicit information that they are strongly outcome dependent than if they receive no such information.
To test this hypothesis, we set up an experiment in which recipients received implicit or explicit
outcome dependence information. In correspondence with previous procedural justice experiments,
participants were told that some lottery tickets would be divided between themselves and another
participant. Participants in the explicit condition were then told that the number of lottery tickets they
would receive depended on the experimenter’s decision, whereas participants in the implicit control
condition did not receive this information. After this, the experimenter did versus did not allow
participants an opportunity to voice their opinions about how lottery tickets should be divided. The
dependent measures were participants’ evaluations of the way they were treated (Tyler & Lind, 1992).Method
Participants and Design
We tested our prediction in a 2 (outcome dependence: implicit vs. explicit) 2 (procedure: voice vs.
no-voice) factorial design. Participants were 80 students at Leiden University (18 men, 62 women),
varying in age from 18 to 28 years. The design was balanced with 20 participants randomly assigned to
each experimental condition. The experiment was preceded by two other, unrelated experiments.
Together the experiments lasted a total of 1.5 hours. All participants participated voluntarily and were
paid 20 Dutch guilders for their participation in the experiments (1 Dutch guilder equaled US $0.50 at
the time the present studies were conducted).Experimental Procedure
On arrival at the laboratory, participants were led individually to separate cubicles. Each cubicle
contained computer equipment, which was used to present the stimulus information. The experiment
was presented as a study on how people perform tasks. It was suggested that in another cubicle, another
person participated, a person referred to as ‘Other’ for the rest of the experiment. Furthermore,
participants were told that the experimenter could send messages to the participants by means of a
computer network (in fact, all stimulus information was preprogrammed; a procedure to which none of
the participants objected upon debriefing).
The experimental procedure was then explained to the participants. Participants would perform
tasks in two rounds: a practice round of 2 minutes and a work round of 10 minutes. Furthermore,
participants were informed that, after all participants had completed the experiment, a lottery would beCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1286–1297 (2007)
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Participants were told that a total of 200 lottery tickets would be divided among all participants.
Furthermore, participants were told that after the work round some lottery tickets would be divided
between the participant and Other. To enhance comprehension of the experimental procedure, some
practice questions were posed. If participants gave a wrong answer to a question, the correct answer
was disclosed and the main characteristics of the experimental procedure were repeated.
Participants then conducted the tasks, which entailed the counting of squares within larger figures
(for detailed descriptions of the tasks, see Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001; Van den Bos, Wilke, &
Lind, 1998). At the end of the work round, all participants were informed that Other had completed a
comparable number of tasks. We then manipulated outcome dependence. In the explicit condition,
participants read a sentence stating that the number of lottery tickets they would receive depended on
the experimenter’s decision, thereby receiving explicit information that they were strongly outcome
dependent. Participants in the implicit control condition did not read the explicit outcome dependence
sentence, thereby being a replication of what default has been done in previous procedural justice
experiments (see, e.g., Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001; Van den Bos, Wilke, &
Lind, 1998; Van Prooijen et al., 2002, 2004, 2005).
The manipulation of procedure was then administered to the participants. Participants in the voice
condition were informed that they were allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion about the
percentage of lottery tickets that they should receive relative to Other, and were asked to type in this
percentage. Participants in the no-voice condition were informed that they were not allowed an
opportunity to voice their opinion about the percentage of lottery tickets that they should receive
relative to Other, and were not asked to type in this percentage. Participants were then informed that
they received three lottery tickets and were left uninformed about the lottery tickets Other received
(cf. Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998). We then assessed the dependent measures and the
manipulation checks.
The main dependent measures were six items that measured participant’s evaluations of the way
they were treated (1¼ not at all, 7¼ very much). Specifically, participants were asked how fair, just,
and appropriate the way they were treated was, and how satisfied, glad, and happy they were with the
way they were treated. It turned out that these six items were strongly correlated (rs> .69, ps< .001),
and, in correspondence with previous research (Van den Bos & Lind, 2001; Van Prooijen et al., 2005),
we averaged them to form a reliable composite scale of participants’ procedure judgments (a¼ .96).1
We checked the dependence manipulation with two items (1¼ not at all, 7¼ very much): ‘To what
extent was it made explicit that you were dependent on the experimenter for the number of lottery
tickets that you would receive?’ and ‘To what extent was it emphasized that you were dependent on the
experimenter for the number of lottery tickets that you would receive?’. These two items were averaged
into a reliable explicitness scale (a¼ .96). Furthermore, to ascertain whether the dependence
manipulation was successful in inducing varying levels of outcome dependence, participants were
asked the following question: ‘To what extent were you dependent on the experimenter for the number
of lottery tickets you would receive?’ (1¼ not at all, 7¼ very much).
The procedure manipulation was checked with the following two questions (1¼ not at all, 7¼ very
much): ‘Did you get an opportunity to voice your opinion?’ and ‘To what extent did you get an1It has been argued in the literature that procedural fairness and satisfaction judgments may be so closely related that it is
appropriate to focus on the convergence rather than on the divergence of the two (see, e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996;
Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). As a result of this insight, it is not uncommon to combine both types of judgments into one
general measure of procedure judgments (see, e.g., Van den Bos & Lind, 2001; Van Prooijen et al., 2005). However, other studies
have found that in specific situations, such as when evaluating social comparison-based outcomes, these types of judgments are
perceived differently by participants (Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, et al., 1998). Given that in both our current experiments these
judgments were so strongly correlated, we averaged participants’ answers into a reliable measure of procedure judgments
(cf. Van den Bos & Lind, 2001).
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1286–1297 (2007)
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scale (a¼ .95). After this, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid for their participation.Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks
The results were analyzed by means of 2 2 analyses of variance (ANOVAs). On the explicitness scale
we found a significant main effect of outcome dependence information only, F(1, 76)¼ 88.24,
p< .001, h2¼ 0.54. Participants rated dependence to be made more explicit in the explicit condition
(M¼ 6.81, SD¼ 0.50) than in the implicit condition (M¼ 3.75, SD¼ 1.98).
Furthermore, on the outcome dependence question we found a significant outcome dependence
information main effect only, F(1, 76)¼ 8.20, p< .01, h2¼ 0.10. Participants in the explicit condition
perceived themselves to be more outcome dependent (M¼ 6.50, SD¼ 1.13) than participants in the
implicit condition (M¼ 5.58, SD¼ 1.74). Additionally, in the implicit condition the moderately high
mean (5.58 on a seven-point scale) suggested that participants perceived themselves as moderately
strongly dependent, whereas in the explicit condition the very high mean (6.50 on a 7-point scale)
suggested that participants perceived themselves as very strongly dependent, as was intended with this
manipulation. These results indicate that the manipulation of outcome dependence information was
successful in varying the relative strength of participants’ perceived outcome dependence.
On the procedure check scale we found a significant main effect of procedure only, F(1, 76)¼
848.24, p< .001, h2¼ 0.92. Participants in the voice condition perceived more opportunities to voice
their opinions (M¼ 6.15, SD¼ 1.08) than participants in the no-voice condition (M¼ 1.04, SD¼ 0.24).
From these findings we conclude that participants perceived the experimental manipulations as
intended.Procedure Judgments
On the procedure judgments scale, we found a significant main effect of procedure, F(1, 76)¼ 45.92,
p< .001, h2¼ 0.38. More important, however, a significant interaction between outcome dependence
information and procedure also emerged, F(1, 76)¼ 4.64, p< .03, h2¼ 0.06. Means and standard
deviations are presented in Table 1. In correspondence with our hypothesis, the effect of procedure was
stronger in the implicit condition, F(1, 76)¼ 39.87, p< .001, h2¼ 0.34, than in the explicit condition,Table 1. Means and standard deviations of procedure judgments as a function of outcome dependence
information and procedure
Procedure
Outcome dependence information
Implicit Explicit
M SD M SD
Voice procedure 4.81a 1.25 3.80b 1.15
No-voice procedure 2.44c 1.15 2.58c 1.18
Note. Means are on seven-point scales, with higher values indicatingmore positive procedure judgments.Means with no subscript
in common differ as indicated by Tukey’s HSD test (p< .05).
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1286–1297 (2007)
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dependence information was significant in the voice condition, F(1, 76)¼ 7.24, p< .01, h2¼ 0.09, but
not in the no-voice condition, F(1, 76)¼ 0.13, p¼ .72, h2¼ 0.00. Thus, outcome dependence
information led to less positive procedure judgments among participants who were granted voice but
did not influence procedure judgments of those who were denied voice.
To summarize, the results corresponded to the hypothesis that explicit information that the recipient
is strongly outcome dependent yields weaker voice effects than an implicit control condition. In
Experiment 2 we try to replicate and extend these findings.EXPERIMENT 2In Experiment 2, we extended Experiment 1 in two important ways. First, based on Experiment 1 it is
not entirely clear whether the effects are driven by explicitness or strength of outcome dependence. The
purpose of the manipulation of explicit outcome dependence that we used in Experiment 1 was to
operationalize the strength of outcome dependence, and our line of reasoning implied that it was
strength, and not explicit information (making outcome dependence salient) per se, that decreased the
effects of voice procedures. In Experiment 2, we manipulated strong versus weak outcome
dependence: Participants received explicit information that their number of lottery tickets depended
either on the experimenter’s decisions (strong dependence) or on their own task performance (weak
dependence). Based on our line of reasoning, we expected a stronger procedure effect in the weak as
opposed to the strong outcome dependent condition. Given that both weak and strong outcome
dependence was communicated explicitly to participants, this experiment was designed to investigate
whether or not the effects apply only to strongly dependent situations.
As a second extension, we tested in Experiment 2 the assumption that outcome dependence has
implications for the value-expressive function of voice procedures. In particular, in Experiment 1 we
manipulated voice versus no-voice before the decision was made. Based on Experiment 1 alone, it can
therefore not be concluded whether outcome dependence influences responses to voice procedures
because of the implications for recipients’ instrumental concerns (e.g., trying to influence the decision
through voice) or because of the implications for value-expressive aspects of voice (e.g., having the
feeling that the authority displays a genuine effort to be polite). Following Lind et al. (1990) we
manipulated procedure by using a manipulation of post-decision voice. That is, participants were
granted or denied voice after having received the outcome. If people express their opinions after having
received the outcome, these opinions cannot influence the outcomes. Effects of post-decision
procedures therefore are attributable only to noninstrumental implications of the procedure. As such,
effects of outcome dependence on responses to post-decision voice would be consistent with our line of
reasoning that outcome dependence promotes suspicions that the authority may not seriously consider
the recipients’ views.
Method
Participants and Design
We tested our hypothesis in a 2 (outcome dependence: weak vs. strong) 2 (procedure: voice vs.
no-voice) factorial design. Participants were 80 students at Leiden University (16 men, 64 women),
between 18 and 35 years of age. The experiment was preceded by another, unrelated experiment. All
participants voluntarily participated in the two experiments and were paid 15 Dutch guilders for their
participation in the two experiments.Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1286–1297 (2007)
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Up until the tasks, the procedure was identical to Experiment 1. After the work round had ended,
participants were again informed that Other had completed a comparable number of tasks. We then
manipulated outcome dependence. In the weak outcome dependence condition, participants were
informed that the number of lottery tickets they would receive depended on their own task performance
and not on the experimenter’s decision. In the strong outcome dependence condition, participants were
informed that the number of lottery tickets they would receive depended on the experimenter’s decision
and not on their own task performance. We then provided participants with an outcome: Following Van
den Bos, Wilke, and Lind (1998), all participants were informed that they received three lottery tickets.
After this, procedure was manipulated. In the post-decision voice condition, participants were asked to
voice their opinion about the percentage of lottery tickets they believe that they should have received
relative to Other, and to type in this percentage. In the post-decision no-voice condition, participants
were informed that they were not allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion about the percentage of
lottery tickets they believe they should have received relative to Other.
We then measured participants’ procedure judgments with the same six items as in Experiment 1.
Again, these items were strongly correlated (rs> .77, ps< .001), and we therefore averaged them into a
reliable composite measure of procedure judgments (a¼ .97). To check the outcome dependence
manipulation, we asked the following questions (1¼ not at all, 7¼ very much): ‘To what extent did the
number of lottery tickets that you received depend on the experimenter’s decision?’ and ‘Towhat extent
did the number of lottery tickets that you received depend on your own task performance?’ (recoded).
These two items were averaged into a reliable outcome dependence scale (a¼ .91). We checked the
manipulation of procedure with the questions (1¼ not at all, 7¼ very much): ‘Did you get an
opportunity to voice your opinion?’ and ‘To what extent did you get an opportunity to voice your
opinion?’. These items were averaged to form a reliable procedure check scale (a¼ .98). After this, the
experiment ended and all participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid for their participation.Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks
A 2 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the dependence scale yielded a main effect of the outcome
dependence manipulation only, F(1, 76)¼ 195.11, p< .001, h2¼ 0.72. In the weak outcome
dependence condition, participants believed that the number of lottery tickets they received depended
less on the experimenters’ decision (M¼ 2.40) than in the strong outcome dependence condition
(M¼ 6.64).
An ANOVA on the procedure check scale yielded a significant main effect of the procedure
manipulation only, F(1, 76)¼ 548.70, p< .001, h2¼ 0.88. Participants in the voice condition felt they
had more opportunities to voice their opinion (M¼ 6.40) than participants in the no-voice condition
(M¼ 1.08). These results indicate that the experimental manipulations were perceived as intended.Procedure Judgments
An ANOVA on the procedure judgments scale yielded significant main effects of procedure,
F(1, 76)¼ 14.63, p< .001, h2¼ 0.16, and outcome dependence, F(1, 76)¼ 5.61, p< .03, h2¼ 0.07.
More importantly, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction effect, F(1, 76)¼ 6.11,Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1286–1297 (2007)
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations of procedure judgments as a function of outcome dependence and
procedure—Experiment 2
Dependent variable
Outcome dependence
Weak Strong
M SD M SD
Procedure judgments
Voice procedure 5.27a 1.43 3.72b 1.52
No-voice procedure 3.25b 1.44 3.28b 1.33
Note. Means are on seven-point scales, with higher values indicatingmore positive procedure judgments. Means with no subscript
in common differ as indicated by Tukey’s HSD test (p< .05).
1294 Jan-Willem van Prooijen et al.p< .02, h2¼ 0.07. Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2. In accordance with our
hypothesis, the effect of procedure was significant in the weak outcome dependence condition,
F(1, 76)¼ 19.82, p< .001, h2¼ 0.21, and was not significant in the strong outcome dependence
condition, F(1, 76)¼ 0.92, p¼ .34, h2¼ 0.01. Furthermore, it can be noted that the effect of outcome
dependence was significant in the voice condition, F(1, 76)¼ 11.71, p< .01, h2¼ 0.13, and was not
significant in the no-voice condition, F(1, 76)¼ 0.01, p¼ .94, h2¼ 0.00. These results are in
correspondence with the findings of Experiment 1.
To summarize, these results replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1. The findings again
indicate that strong outcome dependence decreases people’s positive reactions to voice procedures.
Furthermore, Experiment 2 revealed that it is strength of outcome dependence, and not explicitness or
salience, that drives the effects. Finally, in Experiment 2 the predicted pattern emerged following a
manipulation of post-decision voice versus no-voice. Although this finding does not exclude the
possibility that outcome dependence also influences people’s instrumental motivations to have voice, it
does corroborate our assumption that outcome dependence has implications for the value-expressive
function that people attach to voice procedures.GENERAL DISCUSSIONFindings of two experiments corroborated our hypothesis: Information that participants were strongly
outcome dependent reduced the positive effects of voice on procedure judgments in comparison with a
moderate outcome dependent condition (Experiment 1) and a weak outcome dependent condition
(Experiment 2). Furthermore, outcome dependence influenced participants’ reactions to voice
procedures but did not influence participants’ reactions to no-voice procedures, which suggests that the
present results are attributable to a decreased valence of voice opportunities in strongly dependent
situations. Moreover, in Experiment 2 the effects were demonstrated using a post-decision voice
procedure (Lind et al., 1990). All these findings support the argument that the perceived strength of
outcome dependence moderates people’s reactions to voice procedures (cf. Tyler et al., 2000), and that
this is the case because of the implications of outcome dependence for the value-expressive function of
voice.
Inspection of the results revealed that the strong outcome dependent condition yielded a significant
procedure effect in Experiment 1, and a nonsignificant procedure effect in Experiment 2. This
divergence may be caused by the fact that in Experiment 1 we manipulated pre-decision voice versusCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1286–1297 (2007)
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procedures. Our line of reasoning implies that outcome dependence has relational implications for
recipients, thereby influencing their reactions to voice procedures. However, pre-decision voice matters
to people not only for relational, but also for instrumental reasons (Lind et al., 1990). That is,
pre-decision voice may create a sense (or, perhaps, illusion) of control over one’s outcomes, a sense that
is likely to be absent when people are granted voice after the decision has been made. As such, the
procedure effect in the strongly outcome dependent condition may have become significant in
Experiment 1 because of outcome-related concerns. An additional consequence of this was that the
outcome dependence main effect became significant in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1. Looking
at the means in Tables 1 and 2, this main effect was caused by the large difference in responses to voice
procedures in Experiment 2, a difference that, although significant, may have been less pronounced in
Experiment 1. Be that as it may, more important for the current purposes was the finding that strong
outcome dependence reduced the effects of voice; a finding that was replicated in both experiments.
In correspondence with previous research (e.g., Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001; Van den Bos,
Wilke, & Lind, 1998; Van Prooijen et al., 2002), participants were explicitly granted or denied voice in
both experiments. It was important to do so, because it has been shown before that implicit no-voice
procedures (i.e., not mentioning the possibility of voice) are less successful in creating a sense of
procedural unfairness in laboratory experiments (Van den Bos, 1999). When participating in a
laboratory experiment, participants are not likely to expect voice opportunities. Not mentioning the
possibility of voice may therefore go unnoticed, and thus fail to create a sense of procedural unfairness.
Indeed, in everyday life people experience procedural unfairness following no-voice procedures only in
situations where they believe that authorities could and should listen to them (Folger & Cropanzano,
2001). It can therefore be argued here that the explicit denial of voice better mirrors no-voice
procedures in everyday life than implicit no-voice procedures.
In the present experiments, we made efforts to exclude a number of potential alternative
explanations. One of them is salience (or explicitness) of outcome dependence, which may be a
possible alternative explanation of the findings obtained in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, therefore,
we made outcome dependence salient in both the high and low conditions, yet we found the predicted
differences between the conditions. Thus, salience of outcome dependence cannot explain the results of
Experiment 2, and this makes outcome salience unlikely as alternative explanation. In addition, the
present results are not attributable to social category differences, given that no social category
differences were salient within the experiments, and the influence of natural social categories was
excluded by assigning participants randomly to conditions. It must be noted, however, that our outcome
dependence manipulation may have influenced the perceived legitimacy of the decision-making
process. Although it is impossible to check for this possibility (we did not include measures of
legitimacy), we believe that this possibility is closely related to our reasoning that outcome dependence
influences the value-expressive component of voice procedures. After all, we reasoned that strong
outcome dependence may promote the inference that the authority may not consider recipients’ views.
This autocratic perception of the authority may, in turn, be considered as illegitimate, reinforcing the
negative evaluations of the decision-making procedures. As such, attributions of illegitimacy do not
necessarily invalidate our line of reasoning, but rather, such an interpretation would be a specification
that is consistent with our general argument.
The current experiments may inform scientists about social psychological processes that can
potentially occur in numerous social situations. In our world, people often find themselves in strongly
outcome dependent situations. For instance, people who are governed by an autocratic regime or a
dictator, people who work in hierarchically structured organizations, children in boarding schools that
adopt very strict policies, and the like, all constitute instances of recipients that have to deal with
authorities that they are strongly outcome dependent on. The present findings suggest that, in suchCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1286–1297 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
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opinions. An additional implication of this is that, paradoxically, it may be relatively hard for extremely
powerful leaders to gain the trust and respect of their subordinates, because attempts to be fair easily are
interpreted as malicious. These implications are highly speculative, of course, and the present findings
need to be complemented by applied studies that investigate procedural justice effects in these strongly
outcome dependent situations. More generally, although the findings presented here may not be
instantly applicable to all possible types of social situations—as usually is the case in experimental
research—the conclusions that we draw extend existing procedural justice theories (Thibaut &Walker,
1975; Tyler & Lind, 1992) and may therefore provide a more solid theoretical base for both
fundamental and applied research.
To conclude, since the pioneering work of Thibaut and Walker (1975), procedural justice research
has tacitly assumed a specific outcome dependence relation by focusing on people’s encounters with
authorities (for an overview, see, e.g., Tyler & Lind, 1992). Our aim was to investigate the role of
outcome dependence in the psychology of procedural justice, leading to the conclusion that in strongly
outcome dependent situations people’s positive reactions to voice procedures can sometimes be
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